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Although Habermas’ sophisticated conception of constitutional patriotism successfully 
avoids the charge of trying to ground patriotism in a set of principles that is too thin and 
abstract to sustain a real sense of solidarity and belonging, his optimism regarding the 
prospect in modern pluralist societies of building a genuinely shared political culture is 
misplaced. The march of modernisation as rationalisation is neither as relentless nor as 
inevitable as Habermas assumes.  Hence the rational consensus on liberal constitutional 
principles that is to provide the basis for a shared political culture remains elusive. 
However, while Habermas’ solution to the ‘solidarity gap’ that confronts many 
contemporary liberal democracies remains problematic, he is right to point to the 
importance of a shared identity that is strong enough to turn strangers into fellow citizens. 
The challenges that cultural diversity and value pluralism pose for contemporary states 
cannot be resolved via a procedural approach that focuses solely on political legitimacy. 
Yet the difficulties that surround Habermas’ conception of ‘constitutional patriotism’ 
suggest modern states will struggle to build a collective political identity that can 
generate a genuine sense of solidarity. If this is so, modern pluralist states face a more 
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Habermas claims that his version of discourse ethics can be reconciled with the struggle 
for recognition on the part of many groups traditionally marginalized in liberal 
democracies and that, properly understood, a liberal theory of rights is not blind to 
cultural difference. One of the key concepts that informs Habermas’ response to 
questions of cultural diversity is his notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’ 
(Verfassungspatriotismus). While Habermas acknowledges that all constitutional states 
are ethically patterned, he stresses the importance of decoupling the majority culture from 
the wider political culture. Thus Habermas distinguishes between the civic sense of a 
nation based upon the common civic identity of a group of citizens and the particular 
ethical discourses of specific sub-cultures.  On Habermas’ account, democratic 
citizenship does not require that citizens share the same language or the same ethical and 
cultural origins. On the contrary, citizens need only be socialised into a common political 
culture based upon standard liberal constitutional principles. According to Habermas, this 
common political culture provides the basis for a constitutional patriotism that leads to an 
increased awareness of both the diversity and the integrity of the different ways of life 
that coexist in a multicultural society and allows citizens to debate the same legal 
principles from different ethical perspectives.  
 
This paper argues that, although Habermas’ sophisticated conception of constitutional 
patriotism successfully avoids the charge of trying to ground patriotism in principles that 
are too thin and abstract to sustain a real sense of solidarity and belonging, his optimism 
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regarding the prospect of building in modern pluralist societies a genuinely shared 
political culture rests on two distinctive, yet controversial, features of his wider 
philosophical framework: (a) his theory of modernisation as the rationalisation of 
lifeworlds and (b) his continued commitment to rational consensus as a regulative ideal. 
It is these aspects of his wider philosophical framework that lead Habermas to 
underestimate the difficulties inherent in any attempt to build an ‘overlapping consensus’ 
on the liberal values that inform constitutional patriotism. While Habermas paints an 
optimistic picture of the potential for cultural accommodation, even on his  own account 
it is difficult to see how the sharp distinction between political and cultural integration, 
inherent in the idea of decoupling the majority culture from the wider political culture, 
can be maintained. These worries are reinforced by the tensions inherent in the very idea 
of constitutional patriotism. If constitutional patriotism is to generate the sense of loyalty 
and commitment to the state that is widely recognised as an important hallmark of 
political stability, it must be underpinned by a genuine commitment to the liberal political 
culture that informs it.   It is therefore not surprising that for Habermas a commitment to 
individual autonomy provides the rational for and sets the limits to cultural recognition. 
Yet, the emphasis on the critical rationality associated with a commitment to individual 
autonomy sets real limits to the degree of diversity that Habermas’ model can 
accommodate. The paper concludes that while Habermas is right to point to the 
importance of a shared political culture that is strong enough to turn strangers into fellow 
citizens, the difficulties that surround his conception of ‘constitutional patriotism’ suggest 
that such a collective identity may remain elusive.  
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 From Ethnic to Civil Nationalism 
For Habermas modern struggles for recognition bring into sharp focus the ambiguities 
and tensions inherent in the very idea of the modern liberal nation state as it has 
developed in Europe since the end of the 18th century. On Habermas’ reading the modern 
nation state combines two quite disparate ideas: nationalism and republicanism. While 
the republican ideal of a voluntary nation of citizens provides the basis for democratic 
legitimacy, the idea of a pre-political national community addresses the need for social 
integration in the face of the ever-increasing mobility of people that accompanies 
urbanisation and economic modernisation. Indeed, the idea of a shared national 
consciousness grounded in a common ancestry, language and history fills an important 
‘motivational’ or ‘solidarity gap’ as it ‘unites subjects into citizens of a single political 
community – into members who can feel responsible for one another. (Habermas, 
1998a:404). However, while at one level republicanism and nationalism complement one 
another, ultimately the particularism and ascriptive identity of ethnic nationalism remains 
at odds with republicanism’s emphasis on universalism and egalitarianism. Thus, ‘[t]he 
nation is Janus-faced, whereas the voluntary nation of citizens is the source of democratic 
legitimation, the inherited or ascribed nation based on ethical membership (die geborene 
Nation der Volskgenossen) secures social integration’ (Habermas 1998a:405/6).  
 
While historically the modern liberal nation state has always been subject to these 
ambiguities, the accompanying tensions become increasingly apparent in contemporary 
pluralist societies. Ultimately the idea of a pre-political, homogeneous community rests 
upon a myth that can only be sustained through the suppression of heterogeneous 
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elements of the population. It is this suppression of difference and diversity that is being 
challenged forcefully by recent demands for recognition on the part of many traditionally 
marginalised groups. In the face of these challenges Habermas (1998a:407) contents that 
the modern state must find a new ‘functional equivalent for the fusion of the nation of 
citizens with the ethnic nation’. For Habermas this ‘functional equivalent’ is to be found 
in the form of civic nationalism and a more abstract constitutional patriotism 
(Verfassungspatriotismus)1 that ‘relates not to the concrete totality of a nation, but rather 
to abstract procedures and principles’ and identifies with ‘the political order and the 
principles of the basic law’ (Habermas 1989: 261/2 and 257). If, in the face of difference 
and diversity, ‘citizens are to be able to identify on equal terms with their own country’, 
the political culture must not favour or discriminate against any specific subculture 
(Habermas 2001b:75). Hence, while ‘for historic reasons, in many countries the majority 
culture is fused with the general culture that claims to be recognised by all citizens …’, 
‘this fusion must be dissolved if it is to be possible for different cultural, ethnic and 
religious forms of life to coexist and interact on equal terms within the same political 
community’ (Habermas 1998a: 408).  In as far as this process of decoupling is successful, 
it breaks the historical link between republicanism and nationalism and shifts the 
solidarity of citizens onto a constitutional patriotism, which re-directs citizen’s sense of 
loyalty and attachment away from pre-political entities such as the nation, ethnos or the 
family and towards the fundamental principles enshrined in the political culture and the 
basic law. This new resolution of the ‘motivational’ or ‘solidarity gap’ enables 
republicanism to ‘stand on its own feet’ (Habermas 1998a:408). The democratic process 
can now serve as the source of both legitimacy and social integration. Membership of the 
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nation of citizens no longer rests upon an appeal to a shared language or common ethical 
and cultural origins, but merely reflects a shared political culture based upon standard 
liberal constitutional principles.  According to Habermas (1996a:500) the constitutional 
patriotism associated with this shared political culture will give rise to an increased 
awareness of and sensitivity to ‘the integrity of the different forms of life coexisting in a 
multicultural society’. Thus, the decoupling of the majority culture from the political 
culture and the subsequent shift towards a constitutional patriotism provides the basis for 
a differentiated citizenship sensitive to claims for recognition.  
 
Although constitutional patriotism is grounded in a  shared political culture based upon 
standard liberal constitutional principles, in his recent work Habermas has stressed that 
‘constitutional patriotism is not exhausted by a rational agreement on a set of abstract 
principles’ (Habermas in Arnason 2000:4). For many of Habermas’ critics, constitutional 
patriotism, with its emphasis on allegiance to abstract principles and procedures, cannot 
offer an adequate justification for the political boundaries that define states and will 
ultimately be too thin and abstract to generate a genuine sense of solidarity and 
belonging.2 Such lines of criticism, however, underestimate the subtleness and 
complexity of Habermas’ account. While the primary aim of the rule of law in a 
constitutional state is to uphold universally valid norms, such as basic human rights, for 
Habermas (1993:138) ‘every legal system is also the expression of a particular lifeform 
and not merely the reflection of the universal features of basic rights’. Not only does the 
creation of an effective system of law entail the creation of specific rights enacted by a 
particular historical legislature, law is also concerned with the cooperative pursuit of 
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collective goals and the safeguarding of collective goods as well as the rational choice of 
the best means of achieving these goals and goods. Hence, deliberations over policies and 
laws will address ethical-political and pragmatic questions as well as moral ones3. 
Consequently, every state is ‘ethically patterned’ and will interpret universal rights and 
constitutional principles in the light of its particular historical experiences. Particular 
forms of constitutional patriotism, therefore, grow out of and are tied to a particular set of 
institutions and a historical constitution. 
 
Although Habermas’ recognition of the historical and cultural particularity of concrete 
expressions of constitutional patriotism goes a long way to allay the worries of many 
critics, it raises a new set of concerns. Just as the classical nation state is characterised by 
the tension between republican universalism and ethno-national particularism, the 
attachment to universal principles that constitutional patriotism is meant to foster is both 
dependent upon and threatened by the particularity and historical continuity that is 
essential if citizens are to be able to passionately identify with the state (Markell 2000). If 
every legal system is inevitably historically grounded and ethically patterned, modern 
pluralist societies will only be able to develop a genuinely shared political culture, if the 
constitutional traditions that characterise a particular state can be re-interpreted in ways 
that reflect the ethical concerns of the diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups that 
live within this state. While Habermas acknowledges that the political culture that 
informs constitutional patriotism is not value neutral and entails the rejection of 
worldviews and ways of life such as religious fundamentalism, racism, sexual 
chauvinism, radical nationalism and xenophobic ethnocentrism, which are incompatible 
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with the principle of equal treatment, he maintains that constitutional patriotism can 
provide the basis for an ‘overlapping consensus’ which can encompass the overwhelming 
majority of citizens.  Habermas’ optimism about the prospect of achieving such an 
‘overlapping consensus’ ultimately rests upon two distinctive features of his wider 
philosophical framework, which are frequently overlooked in debates surrounding 
constitutional patriotism. These are (a) his theory of modernisation as the rationalisation 
of lifeworlds4 and (b) his continued commitment to rational consensus as a regulative 
ideal. 
 
According to Habermas (1986/1987) modernity not only gives rise to the purposive 
rationality associated with the rationalisation of action systems such as the economy and 
the state that Weber identified, but also entails the development of a communicative 
rationality inherent in the rationalisation of the lifeworld.5 For Habermas (1986) the 
transition to modernity is accompanied by the institutionalisation of differentiated 
knowledge systems, giving rise to the establishment of a scientific enterprise, the 
institutionalisation of an artistic enterprise and the professionalisation of ethics, political 
theory and jurisprudence.  In as far as these new knowledge systems replace the action-
guiding function of traditional knowledge, ritual practices, religious symbolism and ‘the 
power of the sacred’ in everyday communication, ‘there is a rationalisation of everyday 
practice’ (Habermas 1986:340). In such a rationalised lifeworld the latitude for 
interpretation and the need for reasoned justification increasingly open up the authority of 
tradition to criticism, giving rise to a growing differentiation of individual identities and 
an increased sphere of personal autonomy. Given such a decentered understanding of the 
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world, ‘the need for consensus must be met more and more frequently by risky, because 
rationally motivated, agreement’ (Habermas 1986:341). It is this communicative 
rationality that characterises the rationalisation of the lifeworld, a process which, 
according to Habermas, in the final analysis, no culture can resist. As they modernise, all 
lifeworlds ‘progressively loose their capacity to provide prediscursive explanations and 
situation definitions’, giving rise to a de-centred reflective attitude to beliefs and 
practices, which entails, among other things, the ability to recognise that established 
beliefs and practices constitute only one of a variety of ‘possible interpretations of the 
world that can and do compete with others’ (Pensky 2000:71). This process of 
rationalistation makes ‘reasonable political understanding possible, even among 
strangers’ (Habermas 2001b:74).6 Hence democratic procedures no longer need to rely 
upon a prior background consensus based on a homogeneous culture to secure 
legitimacy. 
 
While the process of modernisation makes political understanding among strangers 
possible, it does not guarantee that such an agreement will be reached. Indeed, while 
Habermas encourages citizens to push ‘beyond contested interests and values’ and to seek 
to establish ‘deeper consonances [Übereinstimmungen] in a common form of life’, he 
recognises that in complex and culturally diverse societies it may not be possible to 
identify a generalisable interest or to obtain agreement on the priority of a particular 
value (Habermas 1996a:165). In these cases he appeals to two means of normatively 
neutralising differences: (1) the guarantee of an equal right to coexistence and (2) 
legitimation through procedures (Habermas 1996b). For him, ethically controversial 
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issues can be resolved at a more abstract level by an appeal to an equal right to 
coexistence. This requires a shift in perspective on the part of participants in discourse 
away from the ethical question of ‘what is good for us’ to the moral point of view of what 
is ‘equally good for all’. However, although an appeal to an equal right to coexistence 
holds out the possibility of rational agreement, Habermas is keenly aware that in practice 
even at such an abstract level consensus is rarely reached.  Consequently, Habermas 
invokes a second avenue for the resolution of differences: legitimation through 
procedures. Here the parties must engage in a process of bargaining that seeks to 
establish a negotiated agreement (Vereinbarung) based upon a compromise that balances 
conflicting interests. While a ‘rationally motivated consensus (Einverständniss) rests on 
reasons that convince all the parties in the same way’ (Habermas, 1996a:166), in a 
bargaining process each party may accept a negotiated agreement (Vereinbargung) for its 
own reasons. Nevertheless he stresses that even in negotiated agreements the search for a 
rational consensus remains relevant, although it only plays an indirect role in terms of the 
procedures that govern the bargaining process. Thus he closes the gap between formal, 
procedural legitimacy and substantive, rational acceptability by insisting that ‘legitimate 
procedures themselves depend on rational discourse and reasoned agreement’ (McCarthy, 
1996:1086). For a compromise to be fair all relevant interests must be given equal 
consideration and all parties must have an equal chance to influence the outcome. 
 
Given that for practical reasons decisions must be made despite ongoing dissensus, 
Habermas recognises that one of the most important decision procedures is majority rule. 
However, for him even majority rule ‘retains an internal relation to the search for truth’ 
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(Habermas cited in McCarthy, 1996:1103). Since the procedures that guide deliberation 
themselves are shaped by rational discourse and reasoned agreement, majority decisions 
are merely interim results in a process of discursive opinion formation (Habermas 
1996b).7 If the outvoted minority is to accept majority decisions as legitimate, it must 
recognise them as the product of a process - albeit a fallible one - which aims to arrive at 
the one correct solution to controversial legal and political problems.8  The participants in 
these negotiations must continue to assume that consensus is in principle possible, since 
in the absence of such an assumption ‘political disputes would forfeit their deliberative 
character and degenerate into purely strategic struggles for power’ (Habermas 
1996b:1493).9 Thus, despite his recognition of the ‘facts of pluralism’ and the ‘ethical 
pattering of states’, Habermas retains an emphasis on rational consensus as a regulative 
ideal, which guides deliberation and legitimates the outcome of democratic procedures. 
While the process of modernisation makes political understanding among strangers 
possible, the search for rational consensus facilitates the development of a common 
political culture and secures the legitimacy of democratic processes.  
 
Constitutional Patriotism and the Problem of Cultural Diversity 
Habermas’ sophisticated conception of constitutional patriotism sets out to strike a 
careful balance between a commitment to universal principles and the recognition of 
particularity. Although constitutional patriotism seeks to foster an attachment to universal 
principles, Habermas recognises that if citizens are to passionately identify with the state, 
constitutional patriotism will have to be ‘nourished’ by cultural traditions that support it. 
Thus every concrete expression of constitutional patriotism reflects the culture and 
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history of a particular political community. While the historical and cultural ties of 
concrete expressions of constitutional patriotism potentially threaten the search for 
common ground, Habermas maintains that the shift towards a de-centred, reflective 
attitude associated with modernisation and the search for rational consensus that informs 
democratic procedures will enable modern pluralist societies to built a genuinely shared 
political culture that allows ‘different cultural, ethnic and religious forms of life to coexist 
and interact on equal terms’ (Habermas 1998a:408). Thus, although all concrete 
expressions of constitutional patriotism are ‘ethically patterned’, Habermas believes that 
the constitutional traditions that characterise modern states can be reinterpreted in ways 
that reflect the ethical concerns of the diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups that 
live within the state. If successful, this potentially offers a very attractive resolution of the 
integration problem facing many modern pluralist states. 
 
However, while Habermas’ nuanced account successfully avoids many of the worries 
frequently expressed by critics of constitutional patriotism, his optimism regarding the 
prospect in modern pluralist societies of building a genuinely shared political culture 
remains problematic on at least two counts: (a) not only does Habermas underestimate 
the difficulties inherent in any attempt to decouple the majority culture from the wider 
political culture, (b) his notion of constitutional patriotism entails a more substantive 
commitment to liberal values than he acknowledges. These worries highlight difficulties 
inherent in Habermas’ underlying assumptions regarding modernisation and the potential 
for rational consensus. 
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Habermas’ conception of constitutional patriotism relies upon a sharp distinction between 
political and cultural integration. While all citizens must be socialised into the shared 
political culture, citizens should not be expected to integrate into a privileged cultural 
form of life. The state must be sensitive to the needs of cultural, linguistic and national 
minorities and should ensure that members of such minorities have meaningful cultural 
choices and can participate in their cultural practices.10 Similarly, immigrants should not 
necessarily be expected to give up the way of life typical of their country of origin.11 On 
Habermas’ account (1992:17) 
‘the political acculturation demanded of them does not include the entirety of their 
socialization. With immigration, new forms of life are imported which expand and 
multiply the perspective of all, and on the basis of which the common political 
constitution is always interpreted’. 
 
Yet it is doubtful if even on Habermas’ own account such a sharp distinction between 
political and cultural integration can be maintained. According to Habermas, in modern 
pluralist societies the shared political culture and institutions of the constitutional state 
can provide the basis for social integration because they are political and thus do not 
entail the dangers inherent in an appeal to pre-political nationhood. This, however, 
underestimates the degree to which even the political culture of a community is in 
important respects pre-political.12 As Markell (2000:52) notes: 
The symbols, songs, events, dates and people who capture our political 
imagination; the patterns and structures of civil societies; the vocabularies of 
political analysis and polemic; the “natural fantasies” that “circulate through 
personal/collective consciousness” – all these and more constitute a cultural 
inheritance that the demos did not choose. 
 
Although Habermas recognises that in principle all states are ‘ethically patterned’, he 
maintains that multicultural societies like Switzerland and the United States show that a 
shared political culture can provide a common denominator even in the absence of 
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common linguistic, ethnic or cultural origins. This picture, however, fails to acknowledge 
the extent to which the political culture of even as culturally diverse a society as the 
United States relies upon and perpetuates a strong sense of national identity that draws 
upon many of the pre-political markers identified by Markell. American national identity 
has it ‘own historical myths, it own ‘dreams’, its own sense of mission, its own powerful 
self-image’ (Scruton, 1990:80). While it ‘may be reasonable to contrast nations whose 
distinctive cultural inheritance centres on political symbols and political stories with 
nations whose cultural inheritance centres on language and stories about ethnic origin’, 
this is not to suggest that such political cultures are based on rationally chosen principles 
(Yack1996:197). National symbols such as the American flag are laden with pre-political 
meanings that are neither chosen nor readily open to rational reinterpretation. Indeed 
Habermas’ sharp distinction between political and cultural integration obscures the extent 
to which the ‘ethico-cultural views of the native population … have already shaped the 
political realm in ways that may systematically discriminate against the new citizens and 
make it hard for them to obtain recognition’ (Bellamy 2000: 100). This discrimination not 
only makes it difficult for members of linguistic, ethnic and cultural minorities to fully 
recognise themselves in the institutions and norms that make up the political realm, it 
also undermines their capacity to effectively voice their concerns.13  Not only does the 
relatively low socio-economic position of many immigrant communities make it hard for 
them to mobilize politically, the assumptions embedded in the political culture and the 
prejudices of the native population often lead to the demands of immigrant communities 
being dismissed or misrepresented. For example, even when the British Muslim 
community has formulated its demands for the regulation of free speech in terms of 
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liberal principles regarding defamation or the incitement to violence, there has been a 
tendency to dismiss these demands as rejections of liberal political culture (Bellamy 
2000). While the distinction between the majority culture and the wider political culture 
may well be theoretically impeccable, in practice it is likely be much more difficult to 
sustain than Habermas suggests. Undoubtedly a commitment to constitutional patriotism 
should encourage citizens to reflect upon the impact of existing norms and practices upon 
minorities. Indeed commentators sympathetic to Habermas’ project, such as Markell 
(2000:40) have suggested that ‘constitutional patriotism is best understood not as a safe 
and reliable identification with some pure set of already available universals, but as a 
political practice of refusing and resisting particular identifications’. On such a reading 
constitutional patriotism requires a continued willingness to probe the extent to which 
existing political institutions and practices may fail to truly secure the equal standing of 
all citizens. Such processes will clearly be aided by Habermas’ emphasis on the need for 
a differentiated citizenship that ensures effective political participation for traditionally 
marginalised and socially disadvantaged groups and secures group specific cultural and 
social rights for minority groups. However, ultimately a clear distinction between the 
majority culture and the political culture may only be practically feasible if the 
constitutional principles that inform the political culture can be reinterpreted in ways that 
generate an overlapping consensus that allows citizens with highly diverse conceptions of 
the good to subscribe to the same legal principles from their different ethical 
perspectives. Yet, the tensions inherent in the very idea of constitutional patriotism 
suggest that this assumption is problematic.  
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If constitutional patriotism is to generate the sense of loyalty and commitment to the state 
that is widely recognised as an important hallmark of political stability, it must be 
underpinned by a genuine commitment to the liberal political culture that informs it. It is 
therefore not surprising that for Habermas a commitment to individual autonomy 
provides the rationale for and sets the limits to cultures’ equal right to coexistence. For 
Habermas, cultures and traditions only deserve protection in as far as they promote the 
well-being and freedom of individuals. Thus, the equal right to co-existence of diverse 
worldviews and ways of life not only implies that citizens must be able to practice their 
own culture and traditions, but also entails that individual group members must be free to 
question existing practices, traditions and identities and to break free from them should 
they choose to do so. Indeed, for Habermas the critical rationality associated with a 
commitment to individual autonomy constitutes a vital pre-requisite for full and equal 
participation in practical discourse in a constitutional state. On this account all 
worldviews which ‘lack an awareness of the fallibility of their validity claim’ and do not 
respect what Rawls refers to as the ‘burdens of reason’, are incompatible with practical 
discourse in a constitutional state (Habermas 1993: 143). Such worldviews ‘remove 
themselves from a “modern attitude become reflexive”’ (McCarthy 1996:115), since they 
‘leave no space for reflection on their relationship to … other worldviews with which 
they share the same universe of discourse and against whose competing validity claims 
they can assert themselves only with reasons (Habermas, 1993: 143/4). As Habermas 
recognises the requirement to adopt such a de-centred, reflective attitude to beliefs and 
values may prove quite demanding for some citizens. In this context his recent reflections 
on the burdens that a liberal state places upon citizens who adhere to religious 
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worldviews provide a useful insight into the demands associated with and difficulties 
inherent in the liberal political culture that informs constitutional patriotism. Indeed for 
Habermas religious toleration acts as a pacemaker for cultural rights and thus provides a 
framework for both their justification and their limits.  
 
While Habermas insists that religious worldviews and by implication other traditional 
non-liberal ways of life, can contribute to public discourse from within their own 
perspective, such participation is premised on the assumption that such cultures and 
worldviews have ‘become modernised’ (Habermas 2003:6) and in the process have 
incorporated into their way of life or worldview the normative principles that underpin 
the liberal democratic culture, including a commitment to autonomy and the decentred, 
reflective attitude to beliefs and values associated with this. Thus, according to Habermas 
(2004:13), religious worldviews must differentiate themselves from the wider political 
community and must, from within their own worldview, develop the normative principles 
of the secular society that enable them to recognise why they ‘may realize that ethos 
inscribed in that view only within the limits of what everyone is allowed to do and to 
pursue’. Although Habermas (2006:8/10) acknowledges that the liberal state cannot 
expect all citizens to ‘justify their political statements independently of their religious 
convictions’, religiously grounded justifications expressed in the informal political public 
sphere must be ‘translated’ into secular reasons accessible to all if they are to impact 
upon formal political processes and citizens may only ‘express themselves in a religious 
idiom under the condition that they recognise the institutional translation proviso’. Thus 
to influence the formal political processes contributions to public debate must accord 
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with the liberal political culture.14 While Habermas (2005:27) recognises that the 
‘requirement to show equal respect to each citizen regardless of his ethical self-
understanding or his life-style’ may place a ‘heavy burden’ upon religious believers 
‘whose ethical self-understanding derives from religious truth claiming universal 
validity’, he insists that these demands do not discriminate against such worldviews. 
Although the liberal political culture is not value neutral (Wertneutral), Habermas insists 
that it is neutral in its aims vis-à-vis conceptions of the good (Weltanschauungsneutral). 
Indeed, for Habermas (2004:7), the normative frame of the liberal state is best thought of 
as a module ‘constructed purely with the help of neutral reasons that do not draw on any 
particular worldview’ and which can be incorporated into a diverse range of belief-
systems without denying the absolute truth claims that characterise these worldviews or 
ways of life.15  
 
Yet, it is doubtful whether citizens, who subscribe to worldviews such as religious 
doctrines that claim universal validity, could accept the demands associated with a liberal 
political culture without revising the very substance of their ethical commitments. In this 
context Habermas’ discussion of the controversial question of abortion rights is 
illuminating. While, Habermas (2005:10/13) recognises that ‘[liberal regulations on 
abortion place a greater burden on believing Catholics, or any supporter of a pro-life 
position justified by a religious or other world view’, he insists that ‘[a]s citizens the 
participants [in political discourse] can nonetheless accept a norm as just (for instance, an 
abortion regulation whose effects they find harder to bear than other citizens) if this 
burden appears reasonable to them in comparison with the burden of the discrimination 
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which is thereby eliminated’. Yet it is precisely this balance of burdens that is contested 
in contemporary abortion debates. For many Catholics and other supporters of a pro-life 
position the right to life of the foetus outweighs the right to self-determination on the part 
of the mother. Furthermore, citizens who subscribe to ethical discourses, such as religious 
belief systems that claim universal validity, will consider their ethical claims regarding 
abortion as valid for everyone and not just those who subscribe to their conception of the 
good. For citizens who strongly oppose abortion on these grounds to accept legislation 
that views abortion as a question of individual choice would require a significant revision 
of either the substance of their ethical commitments or the manner in which they hold 
their beliefs. This, however, does not sit well with the claim that the liberal political 
culture that underpins constitutional patriotism can reflect the ethical concerns of diverse 
ethnic, cultural and religious groups.  
 
Although religious worldviews may allow for the exercise of some degree of autonomy, 
they typically do not regard individual autonomy as central to their way of life, nor do 
they hold their beliefs and values in the critical reflexive manner that Habermas demands. 
Furthermore, while Habermas insists that ethical questions are open to rational debate 
only within a concrete way of life or conception of the good, ‘it is a fiction to suggest that 
that ethical discourse is limited to discourse about particular historical groups’ (Bernstein 
1996:1143). As Habermas (2003:7)) recognises major religious communities within 
contemporary liberal societies have by no means completed ‘the cognitive reorganisation 
of doctrines and attitudes’ demanded by the liberal public culture. The same can be said 
of many non-liberal ways of life. The demands associated with the liberal political culture 
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that underpins constitutional patriotism does not just entail the rejection of the claims of 
religious fundamentalists, radical nationalists and xenophobic ethnocentrists, but is liable 
to be problematic for many citizens who subscribe to one of the major religious 
worldviews or who are members of non-liberal communities. Given that the demands the 
liberal public culture places upon such ways of life and worldviews are more substantial 
than Habermas’ image of a ‘neutral module’ suggests, adherents to such worldviews may 
well resist pressures to ‘modernise’. Yet, on Habermas’ account, the critical reflective 
attitude to values and beliefs associated with modernisation constitutes a vital pre-
requisite for rational consensus in the face of ethical disagreement. After all if rational 
consensus is to remain possible despite profound ethical disagreements, participants in 
discourse must be able to distance themselves from their ethical commitments and be 
able to appeal to a shared moral discourse distinct from their different ethical 
commitments. Since groups that have not fully incorporated the normative principles of 
the liberal public culture into their way of life or worldview do not hold their ethical 
commitments in the critical reflective manner associated with a liberal commitment to 
autonomy and do not endorse Habermas’ sharp distinction between ethical and moral 
discourse, Habermas cannot grant equal political recognition to such groups. While such 
citizens are entitled to the basic rights and benefits associated with citizenship, including 
the right to free speech, the demands that spring from their specific ethical commitments 
cannot be readily ‘translated’ into the liberal public culture and thus cannot form part of a 
reciprocal discourse that pushes ‘beyond contested interests and values’ in search for a 
common form of life.16  Although such individuals will be free to follow their 
worldviews and conceptions of the good, their ethical commitments are not allowed to 
 20
shape the agendas and negotiations within political institutions and the broader political 
process that determines what the benefits and burdens of citizenship are.17  
 
Legitimacy, Solidarity and Diversity 
Habermas’ denial of equal recognition to members of groups that do not share the liberal 
commitment to reflexivity, critical rationality and autonomy highlights the tensions 
inherent in his conception of constitutional patriotism. While constitutional patriotism 
can only generate a true sense of loyalty to the state if it is based on a genuine 
commitment to the liberal political culture it seeks to uphold, it is difficult to see how a 
liberal state could win the loyalty and support of citizens with diverse conceptions of the 
good if the challenges cultural diversity poses to collective identity are not fully 
addressed and those members of society whose conception of the good does not coincide 
with the liberal commitment to critical rationality and individual autonomy are denied 
equal recognition. This is not only troubling given Habermas’ long-standing concern with 
social cohesion and legitimacy, ‘a denial of equal political recognition to some persons 
on the basis of the content of their substantive ethical commitments and convictions’ 
borders on contempt and does not sit well with Habermas’ own commitment to respect 
each person’s capacity to form her own conception of the good life’ (Cooke 1997:281). 
Nor does it sit well with the stated goal of constitutional patriotism to build a political 
culture that reflects the ethical commitments of citizens with highly diverse conceptions 
of the good and that enables such citizens ‘to identify on equal terms with their own 
country’ (Habermas 1989:257). Ultimately Habermas’ optimism about the prospect of 
building a genuinely shared political culture underestimates the challenges that cultural 
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diversity poses for the idea of a shared collective identity and political consensus. The 
march of modernisation as rationalisation is neither as relentless nor as inevitable as 
Habermas assumes. Hence the rational consensus on liberal constitutional principles that 
is to provide the basis for a shared political culture remains elusive. Far from acting as a 
common denominator for a diverse range of cultural, ethical and religious worldviews, 
Habermas’ constitutional patriotism entails a substantive commitment to liberal values.18 
Constitutional patriotism is therefore best seen as the expression of a distinctively liberal 
form of civic nationalism. While such a civic nationalism can undoubtedly mitigate the 
violence and exclusion associated with other forms of nationalism, it is not as amenable 
to diversity as supporters such as Habermas assume.  These difficulties lend credence to 
the worries expressed by critics who have questioned attempts to sharply distinguish 
between civic and ethnic nationalism.19 Even in a political community ‘based solely on a 
shared commitment to political principles’, there would be ‘plenty of room [for] 
exclusion and suspicion of difference’ (Yack 1996: 208). In the final analysis 
constitutional patriotism too entails some of the political risks associated with other forms 
of nationalism.  
 
In the light of these difficulties it is tempting to simply abandon Habermas’ search for 
rational consensus in favour of accounts of democratic legitimacy that take the depth of 
diversity that characterises modern pluralist societies as a given. This is indeed the 
avenue pursued by a number of political theorists, including Stuart Hampshire (1999), 
Richard Bellamy (1999), John Gray (2000) and Bikhu Parekh (2000). While these writers 
advocate a variety of responses, all try to develop ‘thin’ procedural accounts of 
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democratic legitimacy that focus first and foremost on the need to secure peace and 
stability in the face of persistent and far reaching disagreements regarding fundamental 
values. In contrast to Habermas’ account, which demands that citizen incorporate the 
normative principles of the liberal public culture into their way of life or worldview, thin 
procedural models merely require that all parties to the negotiations renounce the use of 
force in favour of a peaceful, negotiated settlement of their disputes. Although these 
accounts share Habermas’ preoccupation with the democratic procedures that govern 
conflict resolution, they do not view negotiation, compromise and majority rule as steps 
on the road to rational agreement. On the contrary, on this view democratic procedures 
aim to bring about outcomes that are recognised as legitimate in the absence of an 
agreement on rational acceptability. While procedural fairness demands that all parties 
must be able to participate in the deliberation of public issues and the formulation of 
public policy and insists that all views be given a fair hearing, on these accounts 
procedural rules do not generate substantive conclusions. Consequently political 
agreements are always provisional and subject to challenge and revision.  
 
Such ‘thin’ procedural accounts of democratic legitimacy are arguably well placed to 
recognise the depth and complexity of the pluralism that characterises many 
contemporary liberal democracies. Since these accounts merely require participants to 
respect the constraints imposed by the procedural rules that govern democratic decision-
making, they promise to be significantly more inclusive than Habermas’ account. Indeed, 
while critics frequently express the fear that such accounts are liable to give rise to 
political settlements that simply favour the views of the majority, these models may well 
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be able to generate a genuine sense of political legitimacy through innovative procedures 
and institutions that safeguard the interests of minorities and ensure that political disputes 
are not reduced to purely strategic struggles of power.20 However, while such approaches 
may in principle be able to generate a sense of political legitimacy in the face of a 
profound diversity of conceptions of the good, it is less certain that such models will be 
able to address the ‘motivational’ or ‘solidarity’ gap that has confronted modern states 
since their inception. From a procedural perspective the state derives its stability solely 
from the legitimacy of its decision-making procedures. The loyalty of citizen to the state 
therefore does not obtain from the solidarity of citizens who feel responsible for and 
committed to one another as members of a single political community, but simply rests 
on the ability of citizens to get a ‘fair hearing’ for their views and ‘fair protection’ of their 
interests.  While such a state will promote a range of goods that are of instrumental 
benefit to citizens, such as law and order, security and a range of common provisions, 
securing common goods in this sense is not enough to turn a diverse group of citizens 
into a single people. Indeed such a picture is not only reminiscent of Hobbes’ view of the 
state as an association of self-interested individuals, but also gives rise to similar 
concerns. As critics of Hobbes, like Jean Hampton (1986), have been quick to point out, a 
commonwealth composed of self-interested individuals, whose attachment to the state is 
purely instrumental, is unlikely to succeed in the long-run. Just as Hobbes’ sovereign 
relies upon the willingness of his subjects to incur risks in order to come to his aid in 
enforcing law and order, so modern states rely upon the willingness of citizens to make 
sacrifices for the common good, be it in terms of the everyday redistribution of income to 
meet welfare needs or the more significant sacrifices that may be required in times of 
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national crisis. While even citizens whose attachment to the state is purely instrumental 
may well be willing to incur some costs in return for the benefits that membership 
bestows, such ‘fair-weather’ citizenship does not provide the best foundations for 
political stability. As Margaret Canovan (1996:86) notes ‘in times of crisis … citizens of 
this sort tend to prefer exit over loyalty or voice’. Even though a modern state can afford 
a purely instrumental allegiance on the part of some citizens, it may struggle to sustain 
itself should such an attitude become widespread.  Without a strong sense of solidarity 
there is, as Habermas (2001b) cautions us, a real danger that the political community will 
splinter and fragment as subcultures seal themselves off from one another. The 
challenges that cultural diversity and value pluralism pose for contemporary states cannot 
be resolved by solely focusing on legitimacy. Habermas (1998a:407) is therefore right to 
insist that the modern pluralist state must find ‘a functional equivalent for the fusion of 
the nation of citizens with the ethnic nation’. He is, however, mistaken to assume that this 
functional equivalent is already latent in the values and practices of citizens in 
contemporary liberal democracies. While ‘thin’ procedural approaches underestimate the 
importance of a sense of solidarity, the difficulties inherent in Habermas’ conception of 
‘constitutional patriotism’ highlight the challenges that difference and diversity pose for 
any attempt to built a strong sense of collective identity. If modern pluralist states are to 
find a functional equivalent to the fusion of republicanism and nationalism, they may 
well have to abandon Habermas’ proclaimed goal of state neutrality in favour of the civic 
equivalent of nation building, with all the uncertainties, challenges and dangers that that 
entails. Such a project would require the state to actively promote the core liberal values 
that underpin constitutional patriotism and may, for example, entail steps to contain and 
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curtail the spread of non-autonomy valuing life-styles through a public education that 
actively promotes a decentred and reflexive attitude to beliefs and practices. Yet such 
steps not only risk further marginalising those members of society whose conceptions of 
the good do not endorse these ideals, but may even impact upon the extend to which such 
citizens can exercise their basic right. An education designed to promote the values 
associated with a liberal culture may, for instance, infringe on the general right of parents 
to make educational choices for their children.21 Like other forms of nation building, 
civic nation building runs the risk, at least in the short-run, of reinforcing exclusion and 
heightening suspicion of difference. As with other forms of nation building, there is 
always a danger that the ensuing tensions will undermine the long-term project. Citizens 
who subscribe to ways of life or worldviews that cannot be readily reconciled with a 
liberal culture may well resist policies that actively promote such a culture, giving rise to 
a hardening of attitudes as such subcultures seek to protect themselves from the impact of 
policies designed to promote liberal values. Although writers like Habermas are correct 
to reject models of democratic citizenship that seek to ground political stability in 
legitimacy alone, the challenges associated with building a genuinely shared political 
culture are more complex and troubling than Habermas acknowledges. If the modern 
pluralist state is to avoid the dangers of fragmentation and political instability associated 
with a citizenry whose allegiance to the state is predominantly instrumental, it must 
address, what Habermas aptly terms, the ‘motivational’ or ‘solidarity gap’. Yet the very 
measures that in the long-run may to help build a shared political culture that is strong 
enough unite subjects into citizens of a single political community are in the short-run 
liable to heighten the kind of tensions that threaten to undermine the project of civic 
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nation building. However, if the modern states are to build a strong sense of solidarity in 
the face of difference and diversity these risks may well be unavoidable. 
 
Conclusion 
While Habermas offers an astute analysis of the difficulties that confront modern pluralist 
states, the problems that surround his proposed solution suggest such states may well 
struggle to find an effective functional equivalent to the peculiar fusion of republicanism 
and nationalism that gave rise to the nation state. Although Habermas’ sophisticated 
conception of constitutional patriotism sets out to strike a careful balance between a 
commitment to universal principles and the recognition of particularity, his optimism 
regarding the prospect of building in modern pluralist societies a genuinely shared 
political culture is misplaced. Not only does he underestimate the difficulties inherent in 
any attempt to decouple the majority culture from the wider political culture, his notion 
of constitutional patriotism entails a more substantive commitment to liberal values than 
he acknowledges. However, while Habermas’ solution to the ‘solidarity gap’ that 
confronts many contemporary liberal democracies remains problematic, he is right to 
point to the importance of a shared political culture that is strong enough to turn strangers 
into fellow citizens. Yet the difficulties that surround his conception of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ suggest that modern states will face profound challenges in their attempts to 





                                                                                                                                                                             
Endnotes 
 
1 Habermas first formulated the concept of constitutional patriotism in response to debates surrounding 
German national identity in the wake of German reunification. Given German history, Habermas argues 
that a modern German identity must be based on respect for the constitution and the fundamental 
democratic rights safeguarded therein rather than any appeal to ethnic nationhood. Consequently, for 
Habermas the incorporation of the East German states into the Federal Republic is best seen as the 
restoration of democracy and a constitutional state rather than the reunification of a prepolitical community 
with a shared history and destiny. For a discussion of German reunification and the Historikerstreit 
(historian’s dispute) see Habermas 1989. In his later work Habermas contents that all modern constitutional 
states must move towards a constitutional patriotism, if they are to respond adequately to the challenges 
posed by demands for recognition on the part of traditionally marginalized group. See for example 
Habermas 1998a. 
 
2  For a discussion of this line of criticism see Ingram (1996), Yack (1996) and Markell (2000).  
 
3 Ethical-political questions address the community’s shared form of life and ideals that members feel 
should shape their common life, while pragmatic questions assess the consequences of particular actions 
and seek to establish the best strategy for attaining our ends. In Between Facts and Norms Habermas 
distinguishes ethical political discourses from moral discourses. Whereas moral discourses aim at a 
universal and impartial point of view, ethical-political discourses express the authentic self understanding 
of a particular community. Thus while moral discourse encompasses all of humanity and seeks to establish 
norms that are in the equal interest of all, ethical political discourse takes place among the members of a 
specific political community. Consequently the discourse principle, which demands that only ‘those action 
norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse’, 
merely takes the form of a universalisation principle in relation to moral norms (Habermas 1996a 107). As 
the expression of a particular form of life, the formation of political will, on the other hand, is shaped by 
ethical and pragmatic as well as moral reasons and consequently is always tied to specific and contingent 
contexts. However the distinctive political identity of a particular state must not violate the demands of 
moral discourse. Not only must every constitutional state ensure that the human rights of all citizens are 
protected, it must also strive to be neutral between various conceptions of the good and the different socio-
cultural subgroups within the state. 
 
4 According to Habermas (cited in McCarthy 1986:xxvi) the lifeworld constitutes a culturally transmitted 
and linguistically organised stock of interpretive patterns’. The implicit knowledge inherent in the lifeworld 
provides actors with a set of unproblematic background convictions ‘upon which they draw in the 
negotiation of common definitions of situations’ (McCarthy 1986:xxvi). While actors can reflect upon and 
criticise particular aspects of their lifeworld, they cannot step outside it. 
 
5 While at one level these two forms of rationality are complimentary developments, ‘in other respects they 
are counteracting tendencies’. (Habermas, 1986:341). For Habermas the ‘discontents of modernity are not 
rooted in rationalisation as such, but in the failure to develop and institutionalise all the different 
dimensions of reason in a balanced way’ (MacCarthy 1986:xxix). In the absence of institutions that protect 
the lifeworld, the reifying dynamics of economic and administrative subsystems have increasingly 
marginalised communicatively structured interaction. To stem this process does not entail insulating the 
lifeworld from the processes of modernisation, but requires the expansion of communicative rationality. 
The communicatively rationalised lifeworld therefore has to develop institutions that limit and subordinate 
the subsystems of power and money.  In The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas identifies a 
number of potentials for protest that challenge the influence of the subsystems of power and money. 
According to Habermas (1987:392), advanced Western societies have seen a shift away from ‘the welfare 
state pattern of institutionalised conflict over distribution’ to conflicts in the areas of ‘cultural reproduction, 
of social integration and socialisation’. These new conflicts do not focus on economic compensation, but 
seek to protect or restore endangered ways of life or aim to establish reformed ways of life. The underlying 
deficits in these conflicts ‘reflect a reification of communicatively structured domains of action that will not 
respond to the media of power and money’ (Habermas, 12987:392). Such protests can be sources of 
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emancipation and resistance. While in The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas discusses 
developments such as the ecology, antinuclear, peace and women’s movements, the contemporary politics 
of recognition can be seen as a part of this wider phenomenon of protest.  
 
6 In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action Habermas makes an intriguing link between his 
modernisation thesis and individual moral development. Here he (1990:117) contents that Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s ‘theory of moral development offers the possibility of (a) reducing the empirical diversity of 
existing moral views to variation in the contents, in contrast to the universal forms, of moral judgement and 
(b) explaining the remaining structural differences between moralities as differences in the state of 
development of the capacity for moral judgement’. Drawing on Kohlberg’s work, Habermas (1990:177) 
argues that, if successful, individual moral development will give rise to a principled morality that ’robs the 
social world, with its legitimately ordered interpersonal relations, of its natural stability and compels it to 
justify itself.’ The establishment of such a principled morality goes hand in hand with the differentiation 
between moral questions and evaluative questions. While moral questions can in principle be rationally 
decided by an appeal to justice or the universalisability of interests, evaluative questions refer to questions 
of the good life and are accessible to rational discussion only within the horizon of a concrete historical 
form of life or an individual life style’ (Habermas 1990:178) 
 
7 In terms of moral discourse majority decisions are interim results in the search for impartial, universally 
valid norms, whereas in ethical discourses they constitute steps in the search for an all-encompassing 
political culture and a common form of life. 
 
8 According to Cooke (1999: 178) Habermas here ‘draws attention to the important difference between the 
form of coercion involved in the exercise of power within the framework of democratic laws and that 
which is involved wherever this framework is not presumed.’ This is not to suggest that Habermas fails to 
recognise that democratic decision-making involves coercion. Hence, as Cook notes, the worry, expressed 
by Mansbridge (1994) and Cornell (1995), that Habermas denies the moment of coercion, is  unfounded.  
 
9 Indeed, according to Habermas (1996b:1492/3), ‘if essentially relevant value conflicts  and oppositions 
must penetrate all controversial political questions, then in the final analysis we end up with something 
resembling Carl Schmitt’s understanding of politics’. Hence for Habermas democratic legitimacy is only 
possible if we assume that questions of justice can transcend the ethical self-understanding of competing 
forms of life. 
 
10 According to Habermas (1998b:145/6) ‘several different routes to the elusive goal of a “difference 
sensitive” inclusion are … available: federalist delegation of powers, a functionally specified transfer or 
decentralisation of state competencies, above all guarantees of cultural autonomy, group specific rights, 
compensatory policies, and other arrangements for effectively protecting minorities’. 
 
11 On Habermas’ account the cultural rights of immigrants are akin to those of ‘born’ ethnic, cultural and 
national minorities. For Habermas (1993) cultural rights are only legitimate when exercised as individual 
liberties. While the state should ensure that individual members of minority groups are able to pursue their 
way of life, it should not seek to preserve cultures in the same way in which we may attempt to preserve 
endangered species. Indeed he is very critical of the demands by some natural born minorities for corporate 
group rights designed to maintain and perpetuate their particular way of life. According to Habermas, 
policies, such as the Quebec language laws, which specifically seek to socialise future citizens into the 
language, value and norms definitive of a particular culture, extend well beyond what can be justified in 
terms of the provision of meaningful cultural choices for individuals. 
 
12 According to Habermas (cited in Markell 2000:52) an integrative force is pre-political if it is 
‘independent of and prior to the political opinion- and will-formation of the citizens themselves’. 
 
13 It is, of course, a concern with these forms of discrimination which leads Habermas to argue for the need 
to decouple the majority culture from the wider political culture. However, if the political culture itself is 
already shaped by the majority culture, decoupling will not address these concerns. Indeed a sharp 
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distinction between political and cultural integration may make it more difficult to identify and raise 
awareness of the more subtle ways in which the assumptions and prejudices that underpin the political 
culture marginalise the concerns of minority communities.  
 
14  By implication those claims and demands that cannot be ‘translated’ cannot influence formal political 
processes. According to Habermas the liberal state must remain neutral vis-à-vis conceptions of the good 
and therefore cannot tolerate religious justifications in the legislative process itself.  However the liberal 
state cannot oblige them ‘personally to supplement their public statements of religious convictions by 
equivalents in a generally accessible language’ (Habermas 2006:9) Instead Habermas (2005:28) conceives 
of the translation proviso as a co-operative process that requires secular citizens to ‘take part in the efforts 
to translate relevant contributions from the religious language into a publicly accessible language’ (my 
emphasis) and thus insists that such a proviso does not place an undue or asymmetrical burden upon 
citizens who hold strong religious convictions. However, as Habermas (2005:27) himself recognises, 
‘secular citizen with limited metaphysical baggage, who can accept a morally “free-standing” justification 
of democracy and human rights’ can easily recognise that the “right” enjoys priority over the “good”. As a 
consequence secular citizens are arguably liable to find the demand to be respectful and sensitive to the 
truth potential of religious worldviews easier to bear than the burdens the institutional translation proviso 
places upon religious citizens. 
 
15 Habermas takes the notion of the normative frame of the liberal state as a ‘module’ from Rawls.  Indeed 
Habermas’ notion of a civic sense of the nation in many ways mirrors Rawls’ notion of political liberalism  
and the difficulties that Habermas encounters are akin to those facing Rawls. While Rawls maintains that 
his conception of political liberalism will gain the endorsement of, or at least will be compatible with, all 
reasonable doctrines, numerous critics have been quick to point out that far from providing a basis for an 
overlapping consensus that can encompass citizens with highly diverse conceptions of the good, political 
liberalism privileges liberal principles at the expense of worldviews and ways of life that challenge Rawls’ 
sharp public/private distinction. Ultimately, Rawls’ distinction between political and comprehensive 
liberalism rests upon a sharp differentiation between the political and the non-political, which ignores the 
complex interrelationship between the two spheres. For an overview of a range of critical perspectives on 
Rawls’ conception of political liberalism see Baumeister (2000).  
 
16 Since on Habermas’ account the basic rights and benefits associated with citizenship are derived from the 
application of universal norms, these rights and benefits must apply to all citizens equally. 
 
17 On Habermas’ own understanding of the complex relationship between individual liberty and democracy 
this exclusion may have far reaching implications for the standing of such citizens. Given that persons are 
individuated through the processes of socialisation, Habermas maintains that the capacity of individuals to 
pursue their chosen way of life can only be effectively safeguarded if the context within which an 
individual’s identity is formulated is also protected. This can only be achieved if all citizens participate in 
the formulation and interpretation of the rights and norms that safeguard individual freedom.  If the ethical 
commitments of citizens who subscribe to non-autonomy valuing life-styles are not allowed to shape 
democratic discourse, the rights and norms derived from such discourses are unlikely to support the wider 
life context within which their identities have been formulated. This may make it difficult for such citizens 
to even pursue their chosen way of life in the private sphere.  
 
18  This suggests that the wider worries expressed by many generally sympathetic commentators regarding 
Habermas’ continued preoccupation with consensus are justified (see for example Bernstein 1996, Bohman 
1995 &1996, Chambers 1995 & 1996, Dryzeck 2000, Fraser 1992, McCarthy 1996, Rehg and Bohman 
1996). 
 
19 See for example Yack (1996). 
 
20 Habermas (1996b), for instance argues that, in the absence of a search for rational agreement, political 
disputes will be reduced to a purely strategic struggle for power. While such worries cannot be easily 
dismissed, advocates of ‘thin’ procedural models have begun to develop innovative procedures and 
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institutional models that seek to ensure that majority and minority can participate in dialogue and political 
negotiation on equal terms, encourage both the majority and the minority to reflect upon existing norms and 
practices, and promote mutual adaptation and a search for common ground. I have explored a potentially 
promising model in a previous paper (Baumeister 2003). 
 
21 Quong (2004), for example, argues that the imposition of such an education may well infringe the 
general right of parents to make educational choices for their children, but concludes that such an 
infringement is justified in order to secure the long-term stability of liberal democratic regimes. However, 
the degree to which such measures will indeed promote long-term stability will in practice depend upon the 




Arnason, J.P. (2000), ‘Globalism, Ideology and Traditions Interview with Jürgen Habermas’, Thesis 
Eleven, 63 (November), 1-10. 
 
Baumeister, A (2000) Liberalism and the Politics of Difference. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Baumeister, A. (2003) ‘Habermas: Discourse and Cultural Diversity’, Political Studies, Vol.51 (4) 740-758 
 
Bellamy, R. (1999) Liberalism and Pluralism. London: Routledge. 
 
Bellamy, R. (2000) ‘Citizenship beyond the nation state: the case for Europe’, in N.O’Sullivan (ed) 
Political Theory in Transition. London: Routledge. 
 
Bohman, J. (1995) ‘Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism. Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral 
Conflict’, Political Theory, 23 (2), 253-79. 
 
Bohman, J.(1996) Public Deliberation Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press. 
 
Canovan, M. (1996) Nationhood and Political Theory. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Chambers, S. (1995) ‘Discourse and democratic practice’, in S.K. White (ed.), The Cambridge Companion 
to Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 233-259. 
 
Chambers, S. (1996) Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse. Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
 
Cornell, D. (1995) ‘Response to Thomas McCarthy: The Political Alliance between Ethical Feminism and 
Kantian Constructivism’, Constellation, 2 (20, 189-206. 
 
Cook, M (1997) ‘Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of Recognition’, Political 
Theory, 25(2), 258-88. 
 
Cook, M. (1999) ‘Are Ethical Conflicts Irreconcilable?’ in I. MacKenzie and S. O’Neill  (eds.) 
Reconstituting Social Criticism. Houndsmill: Macmillian Press. 
 
Cronin, C. and De Grieff, P. (1998) ‘Editors Introduction’ in Haberms, The Inclusion of the Other. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, vii-xxxii. 
 
Dryzek, J. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: 
University Press.   
 
 31
                                                                                                                                                                             
Fraser, N. (1992) ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy’ in C. Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, N.Y.: MIT. 
 
Gray, J. (2000) Two Faces of Liberalism. Cambridge MA: Polity Press.  
 
Habermas, J. (1986/1987) The Theory of Communicative Action translated by T. McCarthy (Volume One 
1986, Volume Two 1987) Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Habermas, J (1989) ‘Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity: The Federal Republic’s 
Orientation to the West’, in The New Conservatism, edited and translated by Nicholsen.  Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Habermas, J. (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Habermas, J  (1992) ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe’, Praxis 
International, 12 (1), 1-18. 
 
Habermas, J (1993) ‘Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States’, European Journal of Philosophy, 
1 (2), 128-55. 
 
Habermas, J. (1995) ‘Multiculturalism and the Liberal State’, Stanford Law Review, 47 (5), 849-853. 
 
Habermas, J. (1996a) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Habermas, J. (1996b)’Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law’, Cardozo 
Law Review, 17 (4-5), 1477-1557. 
 
Habermas, J. (1998a) ‘The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship’, 
Public Culture, 10 (2), 397-416, 
 
Habermas (1998b) ‘On the Relation between the Nation, the Rule of Law and Democracy’ in The Inclusion 
of the Other.  Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, pp 129-53. 
 
Habermas J. (2001a) ‘Constitutional Democracy A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles? 
Political Theory, 20(6), 766-81. 
 
Habermas, J (2001b) ‘The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy’ in The Postnational 
Constellation Political Essays, translated and edited by Max Pensky. Cambridge: Polity Press, 58-112. 
 
Habermas, J. (2003) ‘ Intolerance and Discrimination’ International Journal of Constitutional Law. 1 (1), 
pp 2-12.  
 
Habermas, J. (2004) ‘Religious Tolerance – The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights’ Philosophy, 79 (1), pp5-
18. 
 
Habermas, J. (2005) ‘Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism’ The Journal 
of Political Philosophy, 12 (1), pp 1-28. 
 
Habermas, J (2006) ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, European Journal of Philosophy, 14 (1), pp 1-25.  
 
Hampshire (1999) Justice is Conflict. London: Duckworth. 
 
Hampton, J. (1986) Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Ingram, A. (1996) ‘Constitutional Patriotism’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 22 (6), 1-18. 
 32
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
Mansbridge, J. (1994) ‘Using Power / Fighting Power’, Constellations, 1 (1), 53-73. 
 
Markell, P. (2000) ‘Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On ‘Constitutional Patriotism’, Political Theory, 
20 (1), 39-63. 
 
McCarthy, T. (1986) ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, pp vii-xxxix. 
 
McCarthy, T. (1996) ‘Legitimacy and Diversity: Dialectical Reflections on Analytical Distinctions’, 
Cardozo Law Review, 17 (4-5), 1081-1125. 
 
Parekh, B. (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism. London: Macmillian Press. 
 
Pensky, M. (2000) ‘Cosmopolitanism and the Solidarity Problem: Habermas on National and Cultural 
Idenities’, Constellations 7 (1), 64-79. 
 
Quong, J. (2004) ‘The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens’, The Journal of Political Philosopy, 12 (3), 
pp.314-335. 
 
Rehg, W. and Bohman, J. (1996) ‘Discourse and Democracy: The Formal and Informal Bases of 
Legitimacy in Habermas’ Fatizität und Geltung’, The Journal of Political Philosophy,  (1), 79-99. 
 
Scruton, R. (1990) ‘In Defence of the Nation’, in Clark, J.C.D. Ideas and Politics in Modern Britain. 
Houndmills: Macmillian., pp 53-86. 
 
Yack, B. (1996) ‘The Myth of the Civic Nation’, Critical Review, 10(2), 193-211. 
 33
